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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy—Quaker City Doctrine—Pennsylvania Uniform Commer-
cial Code.—In the Matter of Einhorn Bros., Inc.,' a creditor loaned money
to Einhorn Eros., Inc., and obtained a perfected security interest in its
merchandise inventories under UCC of Pennsylvania § 9-302 in January
1957. Ten months later in November 1957 the landlord levied a distraint for
rent against Einhorn's property. Subsequently the debtor went into bank-
ruptcy. The referee ordered the landlord's lien satisfied ahead of that of the
secured creditor. The secured creditor appealed to the District Court main-
taining that under the UCC of Pennsylvania, its perfected security interest
was superior to that of the landlord and therefore it was improperly sub-
ordinated to the landlord's lien. The Court affirmed the referee's Order for
Final Distribution. The doctrine of In re Quaker City Uniform Co., Inc.,2
requires that priorities under state law as between a chattel mortgage and a
landlord's lien be observed in a bankruptcy proceeding. 5 The Pennsylvania
law existing before adoption of the UCC provided that on any sale follow-
ing a distraint for rent the landlord's lien should be satisfied first. 4 The
UCC § 9-104(b) had excluded the landlord's lien from the purview of the
article on secured transactions. The "rational conclusion" was that the
previous Pennsylvania law was left undisturbed by the enactment of the
Code.
In affirming the referee the Court appears correct. It is plain from
the language of UCC § 9-104 and the comment thereto that the Code ex-
pressly intended to plaCe the landlord's lien outside the coverage of the
article. This being so, the existing state law must govern. It is interesting,
however, that the Court took occasion to disapprove a construction of the
Pennsylvania UCC § 9-310.5 This construction argued(' that a landlord
was one who in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services to
goods kept on the rented premises. Since the landlord had a lien for rent
in Pennsylvania by settled rule of law, having furnished services, he met
the requirement of § 9-310, and therefore took priority, under the Code,
over other perfected security interests. The Court relied on the comment
1 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
2 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956).
67c(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § 107c(1).
4 Pa. Stats. Ann. Tit. 68, § 322 (Purdon Supp. 1958) ; In re Quaker City Uniform
Co., supra note 2; Reinhart v. Gerhardt, 152 Pa. Super. 229, 31 A.2d 737 (1943);
National Cash Register Co. v. Anse11, 125 Pa. Super. 309, 189 Atl. 738 (1937).
6 § 9-310 of the Pennsylvania UCC states: When a person in the ordinary course
of his business furnishes services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes
priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute
expressly provides otherwise.
6 Pa. Bar Association Notes to UCC § 9-310; Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel
Security & the Commercial Code, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 530, 540-41 (1950).
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to this section stating that § 9-310 meant to provide liens for work done
to enhance or preserve the value of collateral. The act of leasing the premises
could hardly be thought to bear this relation to the value of the goods situated
thereon.
In so construing § 9-310 the Court may have been influenced by the
revised text of this section as it appears in the enacted laws of the four
other states having adopted the UCC at this time. 7 Under this, it is
specifically provided that the goods for which services and materials are
furnished must be in the possession of such person before his lien interest
will take priority over a Code security interest. It is quite clear, therefore,
that the service rendered by the landlord in leasing the premises could
not be covered by this section in any state having enacted the revised
text. The Court properly gave to the language of § 9-310 its natural
construction and refused to give to it a strained meaning.
J. LAURENCE MCCARTY
Breach of Warranty—Recovery Allowed by Third Party in the Absence
of Privity—Scope of Liability Extended by Uniform Commercial Code.
—B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond.'—Decedent husband and wife were
killed in their automobile as a result of a "blow-out" of a "blow-out proof"
tire purchased by the husband from defendant manufacturer's retail outlet.
Suit for wrongful death 2
 predicated upon claims of breach of express war-
ranty, implied warranty, and negligence in manufacture was brought by the
administratrix of both decedents in the U. S. District Court for the District
of Kansas. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on the basis of breach
of an express warranty. Affirmed by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. HELD: Although breach of express warranty was a proper
ground of decision on the claim of the decedent purchaser, that of the wife
should have been based upon breach of implied warranty of fitness, which
arises in Kansas by operation of law despite the lack of privity of contract.
The decision is not only in accord with recent Kansas cases, 8
 but also
with those of other common law states which have not enacted the USA. 4
The theory of the case is that when a manufacturer advertises and intro-
9-310 of the UCC as enacted in Massachusetts, Kentucky, Connecticut and
New Hampshire states: When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon
goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials
or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
1 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
2 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 60-3203.
3 Graham v. Bottanfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) ; Nichols v. Nold,
174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Swengel v. F.&E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan.
555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938).
4 Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952),
and cases cited therein; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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